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The Institutional Context of the International Court of Justice
Tom Ginsburg*
For Carlos Esposito and Kate Parlett, eds.,
Cambridge Companion to the International Court of Justice

Institutional analysis is an approach drawn from the social sciences that examines the ways in
which an organization’s internal structures and external environment shape outcomes. There
are many different kinds of institutionalism, but all have in common an emphasis on examining
structures, as opposed to, say, the particular individuals who inhabit institutions, or the role of
ideology at a macro level.1 Institutional analysis has been productively applied to courts and
invites two related inquiries: what is the court’s institutional design, and what is its institutional
environment?
Applying this approach to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”) requires
identification of the relevant actors that shape the Court’s operating environment, as well as
the ways in which they interact with the ICJ. It also requires examination of formal and
informal rules, both inside and outside the ICJ, that frame these interactions. The
attractiveness of any particular judicial institution, including the ICJ, will depend on the quality
of the service it provides and the other options available. The former is in part a product of its
institutional design while the latter is part of the institutional environment.
The formal institutional structures of the ICJ flow from the United Nations Charter (“Charter”)
and the Statute of the Court (“Statute”).2 These documents establish the Court and its
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Dimaggio and Walter W. Powell (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago:
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relationships with other bodies. Neither has ever been amended, though there has been some
informal evolution of the structures over time.
A good place to start is the statement in Article 94 of the Charter, repeated in Article 1 of the
Statute, that the ICJ is the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations.” This tells us, first of
all, that the ICJ is a court. This point may seem so obvious as to not even bear mentioning, but
courts have their own institutional characteristics and distinctive modes of operating. As a
judicial organ, the Court’s job is to adjudicate, as well as to provide authoritative
interpretations of law, including under Articles 65-68 of the Statute, which allow for advisory
opinions.
Second, the ICJ is an international court. Its primary jurisdiction is over states and their
disputes. This means that states will play an important role in determining the ICJ’s workload
and effectiveness.3 States decide whether to file cases, whether to comply with decisions, and
whether to act in accordance with the rules pronounced by the Court. In this sense, states are
both a primary audience for the court but also its clients.
Third, the Court is an organ of the United Nations (“UN”). This tells us that the UN and its
organs form a major part of the ICJ’s institutional environment. The UN is not the only
organization with which the Court interacts, but it plays an important role in selecting judges,
providing funding, bringing requests for advisory opinions, and, potentially, in enforcing
decisions. The relationship with the machinery of the UN conditions the performance and
possibilities of the ICJ.
This Chapter will examine each of these points in turn. One of the themes that emerges from
the analysis in each area is the gap between the formal institutional structures and the actual
operation of the Court. The formal rules matter a good deal, but they do not explain everything
about the way the Court works. In this sense, the Court has had to adapt to its environment.

the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3deb4b9c0.html [accessed 17 March 2020]
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The ICJ as a Court: Adjudication, Consent, and Lawmaking
As institutions, courts have distinctive features and qualities, driven by what Shapiro calls their
“social functions.”4 These functions include, most obviously, the resolution of conflict, but also
social control—the application of a set of norms to parties—and the making of law. Beyond
these, Giladi and Shany identify other goals of the ICJ, including regime support for the UN, for
example through exercise of the advisory jurisdiction over internal matters; regime
legitimation; and the compliance of states with primary international legal norms, in the
shadow of dispute resolution.5 One cannot, Shany emphasizes, measure effectiveness of a
court simply by looking at the cases that come before it: one must also consider cases that do
not arise because of the court’s clarification of norms.6
We focus on dispute resolution and lawmaking as the core functions. It is worth noting that the
former is squarely rooted in the Charter and Statute, the latter is not at all.
A. Dispute Resolution
When two parties, be they individuals, companies or states, have disputes they will turn to a
third party to help resolve the problem. As Shapiro points out, a court is only one among many
types of third parties that disputants might turn to. On the international plane, states have an
array of options to fulfill their obligation under Article 33 of the Charter to seek peaceful
resolution of disputes. These include arbitration (either ad-hoc or through the Permanent Court
of International Arbitration), mediation by regional organizations or individual leaders, use of
good offices, and others. Any court, including the ICJ, thus “competes” for business with other
modes of dispute resolution. The fact that there are other options for dispute resolution means
that only a subset of disputes will ever be brought before any court for formal resolution.7
A critical feature of the ICJ’s institutional design is the importance of consent to jurisdiction.
When parties consent to the jurisdiction of a court, they are more likely to find its actions
4
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Squatrito , Oran R. Young, Andreas Føllesdal, and Geir Ulfstein (eds.),The Performance of International
Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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legitimate and obey its orders. In contrast, when one of the parties does not want to be before
the court (as occurs in, say, criminal law) compliance must be coerced. The distinctive feature
of the international environment is that the ICJ has no direct means of coercing parties to
participate in its proceedings or comply with its judgments. It is true that Article 33 of the
Charter allows the Security Council to call upon parties to settle disputes by particular means,
so that it could, as per Article 36(3) of the Charter, recommend that parties go before the
Court. However, this tool has only been used once by the Security Council, in April 1947, when
it recommended that Albania and the UK refer their dispute on the Corfu Channel to the Court.8
This means that most cases before the ICJ come before it as result of state decisions taken
under Article 36(1) of the Statute, which provides for contentious jurisdiction over cases where
the parties have agreed in a treaty or a special agreement to bring the dispute to the ICJ.9 As of
this writing, 18 decided cases have come to the Court through special agreement/comprimis,
15 of which have concerned disputes over territory or maritime delimitation. Such disputes are
of the type in which the Court excels, in part because once decided, the states have an
incentive to comply rather than escalate the dispute.10
The so-called “Optional Clause” of Article 36(2) of the Statute is another way in which
contentious cases can come before the Court. Through this provision, states can agree to
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court for, inter alia, “any question of international law”, which
provides a kind of general jurisdiction among states. This sets up international adjudication as a
sort of “club good” among states that wish to be subject to general jurisdiction without specific
consent through a treaty or special agreement, although in practice states often formulate
reservations to Article 36(2) declarations so that jurisdiction may be somewhat limited.
Seventy-four states have accepted this jurisdiction in some form as of this writing.
8

S.C. Res. 22 (9 April, 1947)

9

Statute, Art. 36.1 (“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in
force.”)
10

See Tom Ginsburg and Richard McAdams, ‘Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
International Dispute Resolution’ (2004) 45 William and Mary Law Review 1229-1339. I can find only one
such dispute in which compliance was not immediate, the case Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau
Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) Judgment, I.C.J. reports 2008, p. 12.
The decision requested the creation of a Joint technical Committee to implement its decision. Malaysia
claimed that the Committee had reached an impasse in 2013 due to interpretation problem of the
decision. It thus filled a request for interpretation on June 30, 2017 which the parties agreed to
discontinue. See https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/170 [last accessed Mar. 19, 2020].
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Commentators claim that the Optional Clause is in decline, and cases brought under it tend to
provoke preliminary objections to jurisdiction.11
Sometimes consent over jurisdiction may be fictive, taking the route of a long-dormant treaty
clause that the current government wishes to resist. In such cases, the respondent state will file
preliminary objections to jurisdiction, which has occurred in nearly half of the contentious cases
outside of special agreements.12 States might be less likely to comply when they lose a case in
which they have filed preliminary objections.13
The centrality of consent for the exercise of its core institutional function of dispute resolution
contrasts with the position of many courts in national systems, and poses distinctive challenges
to the ICJ. Some institutional features, such as the inclusion of judges ad-hoc under Article 31
of the Statute, seem designed to soften the blow of being brought before the Court?, and are
closer to the practice of arbitral institutions than a national court. The ICJ’s “courtness” is thus
incomplete because it depends heavily on the consent of the parties to proceed, and the Court
itself is not shy about reminding us of the importance of consent.14
This need to secure the parties’ consent has implications for the Court’s jurisprudence. All
courts use mediatory techniques to maintain their legitimacy, but the ICJ eschews these in its
procedure, and some scholars argue that it would be illegitimate for it to utilize them.15 States
have never asked the Court to use its power under Article 38(2) of the Statute to decide cases
ex aequo et bono.16 But while the Court does not use mediatory procedures, it tends to issue

11

On the alleged decline of the Optional Clause, see Eric A. Posner, ‘The Decline of the International
Court of Justice’ in Stefan Voigt, Dieter Schmidtchen and Max Albert (eds.) International Conflict
Resolution (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006); see also Shany, note 3 above, at 170-171.
12

51 out of 107 cases at this writing.
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Ginsburg and McAdams, note 10 above.
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Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 2002 DRC-Rwanda (Jurisdiction and Admissibility [2006]
ICJ Rep 6 para 88
15

Nienke Grossman, ‘Solomonic Judgments and the Legitimacy of the International Court of Justice’ in,
Nienke Grossman et al. (eds.) Legitimacy and International Courts (New York: Cambridge University
Press 2014), p. 43-61.
16
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Handbook On The International Court Of Justice (Chelthenham, UK: Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2019).
5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3974950

decisions that are minimalist, cautious, and “Solomonic” in nature.17 This internal feature of
the Court is arguably attributable to its weak institutional culture position.
B. Lawmaking
Besides resolving disputes, another major social function of courts is lawmaking.18 Scholars of
courts as institutions tend to assume that this is an inevitable part of the judicial function, in
that prior law often runs out. This is especially true of international law, in which norms are
produced in a decentralized process and not always perfectly clear. This means there is a good
deal of need for courts to interpret and fill in the gaps, and thus make law.
The ICJ makes law in the course of both its contentious and advisory jurisdiction, though neither
function is formally recognized. Article 59 of the Statute explicitly states that a “decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”
But many commentators accept that the Court’s pronouncements about rules or principles are
treated as authoritative statements of the law.19 And judges, too, will sometimes admit that
the Court has a role in developing the law.20 Thus, the ICJ plays a lawmaking role as a functional
matter. Furthermore, by virtue of its status as the “World Court”, the ICJ has a certain authority
in its pronouncements of law. As d’Aspremont writes in this volume, the ICJ is the “master of
the sources” with uncontested authority.21
Scholars have traced the ICJ’s impact on many areas of law, and one theme is that the ICJ’s
impact varies with its caseload and the presence of other bodies which also contribute to the
normative development of the law. In subject areas where there is a profusion of specialized
17

Grossman, note 15 above.

18

A third major function is social control: helping to govern a population by imposing norms onto
individuals on behalf of the society. Criminal law, administrative justice and other fields are examples.
See Shapiro, note 4 above. These have few analogies at the ICJ.
19

James Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public international law, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2019), 40 (“In theory the Court applies the law and does not make it […] Yet a decision, especially
if unanimous or almost unanimous, may play a catalytic role in the development of the law.”) For a
critical view, see Mark A. Weisburd, Failings of the International Court of Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016).
20

Robert Y Jennings, ‘The Internal Judicial Practice of the International Court of Justice’” (1988) 59
British Yearbook of International Law 31-47, at 34 (ICJ is “crucially, intimately and inescapably concerned
with the development and shaping of international law.”)
21

Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The International Court of Justice as the Master of the Sources’, this volume.
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bodies and alternative adjudicative fora, such as human rights or international criminal law, the
Court has had relatively little impact. In areas where there are few competitors, such as
territorial boundaries, the Court’s impact on the law is greater.22 For example, one area in
which the Court is competing for business with other tribunals is the law of the sea, in which
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) allows states several options for
dispute resolution, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) as well
as the ICJ.23 The ITLOS, which has primary jurisdiction over cases of prompt release, has had
more impact on the law in that area, while the ICJ has shaped the law of maritime delimitation,
as well as fisheries.
The Court also carries on implicit dialogues with the International law Commission, the organ of
the UN charged with the development of international law. As Crawford notes, the two have
been quite complementary in the development of international law.24
The procedures of the ICJ facilitate its lawmaking role to some extent. Garoupa and Ginsburg
argue that courts whose primary role is social control tend not to have separate opinions.25 But
courts that are engaged in lawmaking do tend to allow separate opinions, because the content
of law is something on which reasonable minds can and do disagree. The practice of the ICJ of
having an unsigned opinion for the Court and signed separate opinions reflects this structure to
some extent, and separate opinions are filed in virtually every contentious case. 26
In sum, the ICJ is most decidedly a court. In its ritual structures and formality, the ICJ exudes
“courtness.” The judges wear robes and sit in a magnificent hall in the Peace Palace in the

22

Christian J. Tams, ‘The ICJ as a “Law-Formative Agency”: Summary and Synthesis’, in Christian J. Tams
and James Sloan (eds.), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (New
York: Oxford University Press 2013) p. 377, 394-95.
23

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 287.

24

James Crawford, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Law of State Responsibility’, in Christian
Tams and James Sloan (eds.), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice
(New York: Oxford University press, 2014) p. 71-86, at 74.
25

Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Reputation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) p.
180-83.
26

See Rules of the International Court of Justice, Art. 95.2 (allowing separate opinions).
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Hague.27 They follow judicial rather than arbitral or mediatory procedures.28 Yet when
compared with national courts, the ICJ lacks certain powers of coercion and this has affected
both the institutional structure as well as the jurisprudence of the Court. One might view the
informal aspects of the institution—the grand procedures and the projection of authority—as
compensating for the structural weakness of the Court.
The International Court: Relations with States
States are a major part of the institutional environment of the Court, and the Statute provides
that “[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court.”29 This means that the ICJ depends
on states to bring it business; if states ignore it, the Court will have no role. State decisions to
refer cases to the Court, in turn, depend on some perception of its effectiveness from the
perspective of states. The literature on the effectiveness of international courts examines the
overall ability of a court to achieve its goals.30 But the goals of a court may be different from
those of states. A court might seek to maximize its impact or reputation, and decisions provide
a critical vehicle for doing so.31 States, however, might sometimes refer cases to court without
any genuine intention of resolving the dispute or complying with any judgment. For example,
they might want to publicize their disputes internationally, or shift blame to other parties to
avoid domestic criticism.
Even setting aside such issues, states will have an interest in the quality of the judicial decision,
as well as the probability of compliance with decisions. Compliance with international judicial
decisions is a topic of major analysis by scholars. After reviewing various definitions, Huneeus
says that “compliance occurs when a state or other actor subject to the court carries out the
actions required by a ruling of the court, or refrains from carrying out actions prohibited by said

27

Peter Tzeng, ‘Judge Bhandari’s Re-election to the International Court of Justice’(2019) 31 National Law
School of India Review 98-110.
28

Handbook of the International Court of Justice , available at(https://www.icjcij.org/files/publications/handbook-of-the-court-en.pdf
29

Art. 34.2.

30

Shany, note 3 above.

31

Shai Dothan, Reputation and Judicial Tactics: A Theory of National and International Courts (New-York:
Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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ruling.”32 She argues that various factors will determine compliance, including those associated
with the court regime, features of the state, and features of the dispute.
Existing studies of the ICJ tend to find relatively high levels of compliance with judgments, even
though measurement issues make statistics tricky.33 Data on file with this author suggests that
out of 63 judgments and decisions which one can easily assess, some 49 (77%) resulted in state
behavior partly or wholly consistent with the operative part of the decision. Other scholars
assert that there has been no case of full defiance of the ICJ since the Nicaragua decision.34
Shany argues that compliance is not a particularly good metric in the ICJ context, and that his
broader concept of effectiveness is a better one.35 But if the ICJ is viewed not as trying to
maximize regime goals of peace and stability, but instead as providing a service to states,
compliance is relevant.
In sum, states are the primary clients of the Court. The Court has done relatively little to
address the grand purposes of peaceful resolution of disputes outlined in the Charter. But it has
provided a modest service to states, particularly in resolving disputes regarding borders and
diplomatic immunities. It has helped states coordinate their behavior in relatively low-stakes
matters. While it is difficult to tell in the abstract whether the usage of the Court has been high
or low, it is worth noting that filings to the Court have increased in recent years. Twenty-six
distinct contentious cases and requests for interpretation were filed in the 2010s, the most of

32

Huneeus, ‘Compliance with Judgments and Decisions’, in Cesare P. R. Romane, Karen Alter and Yuval
Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), pp. 427-463.; see also Diana Kapiszewski and Matthew Taylor, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and
Explaining Adherence to Judicial Rulings, Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 2013), pp. 803-835.
33

Constanze Schulte, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004); Colter Paulson, ‘Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of
Justice Since 1987’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 434-61; Aloysius P. Llamzon,
‘Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice’ (2007) 18
European Journal of International Law 815-52; Heather L. Jones, ‘Why Comply: An Analysis of Trends in
Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice since Nicaragua’ (2012) 12 ChicagoKent Journal of International and Comparative Law 57-100 ; Ginsburg and McAdams, note 10 above.
34

Llamzon, note 33 above; Jones, note 33 above.

35

Shany, note 3 above, at 134.
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any decade.36 The Court seems to have found a place to operate within its institutional
environment.
The United Nations and its Organs
The Court must also interact with various UN organs as part of its institutional design. As a
formal matter, the Court is composed by the General Assembly and the Security Council, which
elects its judges in accordance with Article 10 of the Statute. The Secretary-General receives a
list of nominations from national groups of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, ensures
eligibility, and presents the list to the General Assembly and Security Council.37 The electors,
according to Article 9 of the Statute, are to consider the collective diversity of the Court,
ensuring that “the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world” are
represented. The voting rule is an absolute majority in each body, proceeding independently,
with no special privilege for the permanent members of the Security Council. There have been
two informal norms that condition the selection of members: first, there has been by custom a
certain distribution among the five regional groups in the UN system, and second, there was a
norm that each permanent member would have a judge on the Court. Both norms were
recently broken in 2017, when the Indian judge Dalveer Bhandari was elected over the British
judge Sir Christopher Greenwood.38 This meant that the Asia-Pacific Group now had four
judges on the Court, while the Western Europe and Others Group had four as well, an
adjustment of the prior configuration.
In keeping with its special role under the Charter with regard to the budget, salaries for the
members of the Court and registrar, along with the budget, are set by the General Assembly. 39
Similar to a rule set in many national constitutions, the Statute provides that salaries of judges

36

This statistic aggregates cases arising out of common fact patterns filed in the same year, but includes
requests for interpretation opened later.
37

Statute, Arts 5-7.

38

The norm was also violated between 1967 and 1985 when there was no Chinese judge, due to the
credentials contest between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. Tzeng. Tzeng
notes that the mechanism designed to break deadlocks between the General Assembly and the Security
Council, a joint conference laid out in Article 12 of the Statute, was not utilized and never has been. That
clause allows judges who have been successfully elected to choose the remaining candidates to fill the
vacancies.
39

Statute, Art 32
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may not be decreased during their terms of office.40 This is designed to ensure independence of
the members from pressures.
Under the Charter, the Security Council has the role of ensuring the pacific settlement of
disputes, and in doing so, is to “take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general
rule be referred by the parties” to the Court.41 The Statute also provides for provisional
measures, which are to be notified to the parties and to the Security Council.42 Article 94 of the
Charter provides that each member of the UN agrees to comply with decisions of the Court “in
any case to which it is a party.” Furthermore, Article 94 (2) of the Charter allows states to go to
the Security Council in the event of non-compliance with judgements. The Security Council can
then make recommendations or “decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment.”43 Since decisions are binding under Article 25 of the Statute, this is formidable
power indeed. But despite occasional calls,44 the Security Council has never employed its power
under Article 94(2).45 Again, we observe a gap between paper and practice.
The General Assembly or Security Council can by right seek advisory opinions from the Court,
and to date 27 have been issued. Other UN organs are also welcomed to seek such opinions in
their areas of competence. While many of these are framed as internal questions of the
organization, they obviously have profound consequences for the operation of international
law: admission to UN membership, for example, requires defining the characteristics of
statehood, and decisions about the powers of UN bodies will have a general impact on the law
of international organizations.
The scope of advisory opinions has arguably broadened in recent years in a more political
direction, with opinions like the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Wall Advisory Opinion,

40

Id.

41

Statute, Art 36

42

Statute, Art 41.

43

Charter, Art 94.2.

44

E.g. on 22 January 2002, Honduras sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, requesting its
intervention to ensure the judgement of the ICJ of 11 September 1992 in the case concerning Land,
Island, and Maritime frontier dispute (Honduras, El Salvador).
45

Aloysius P. Llamzon, ‘Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of
Justice’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 815-52 at 847.
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and the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.46 Many of these advisory opinions in fact concern bilateral
conflict among states, and have distributive consequences among them. At least two of these
recent decisions—those related to nuclear weapons and Kosovo--are notable for their caution
and somewhat Solomonic character, but others involving great powers are bolder in their
effect. In particular, the 2019 opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the
Chagos Islands from Mauritius marked a frontal challenge to the legacies of colonialism and
decolonization, demanding that the British government to give up its claim to Diego Garcia, a
militarized atoll in the Indian Ocean.47
Another set of cases concern the internal operations of the UN.48 Sloan and Hernandez note
that, as the principal judicial organ, the Court is implicitly and sometimes explicitly called on to
deal with boundary disputes over authority within the organization. Yet the Court has assumed
a generally deferential attitude toward the other UN organs.49 In the decision on Conditions of
Admission, the Court held that member states could not add conditions to those listed in Article
4(1) of the Charter in voting for admission of a member state. This strengthened the General
Assembly and Security Council relative to member states. It has also considered whether the
General Assembly had the power to ignore awards made by an employment tribunal it
establishes.50
The Court’s famous decision in Reparation for Injuries adopted the view that the Court had an
inherent power to interpret the Charter, and that the Charter granted certain implied powers to
the organization, even if not explicitly set out in the text. Sought by the General Assembly, this
Advisory Opinion gave the organization international legal personality and the ability to pursue
46

Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo
(Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004); Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear
Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996).
47

Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius (Advisory Opinion, 25
February 2019).
48

James Sloan and Gleider I Hernandez, ‘The Role of the International Court of Justice in the
Development of the Institutional Law of the United Nations’, in Christian Tams and James Sloan (eds.),
The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (New York: Oxford University
press, 2014) pp. 198-233.
49

Id. at 199

50

Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory
Opinion of 13 July 1954).
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claims for damages to itself and its agents. Notably the Opinion found that the ability to pursue
claims extended to claims against all states, not simply those which were signatories to the
Charter. This was a formidable and important Opinion.
Relations between two political organs—the General Assembly and the Security Council—were
implicated in some advisory opinions. Certain Expenses provides one example.51 Certain
Expenses concerned two peacekeeping missions, one in the Suez and the other in the Congo.
The first of these was established by the General Assembly, while the second had been the
subject of a General Assembly resolution, seemingly infringing on the power of the Security
Council over matters of peace and security. The Court found that the General Assembly’s
exercise of competence in this area did not infringe on that of the Security Council, reading the
powers to be overlapping and mutually compatible.
Despite these cases, which in some sense examine whether powers are being exercised ultra
vires, the Court has never claimed the power to review acts of the Security Council for
conformity with the Charter. Yet at the same time, the Court has occasionally engaged out of
necessity in interpretation of Security Council resolutions.52 The Court has denied that this
involves the practice of judicial review, or the ultimate and exclusive power to interpret the
Charter.53 In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion the Court had to look to the context of Security
Council Resolution 1244 to examine whether it determined the final status of the territory.
That Resolution had guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
but in a cautious opinion, the Court found sufficient ambiguity to decide that it could not
declare that the Kosovo declaration of independence was illegal.54
In the Lockerbie case, Libya claimed that the request for extradition by the United States and
the United Kingdom of the bombing suspects violated its rights under the Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation.55 As the Court was preparing to

51

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion of
20 July 1962).
52

Kosovo Advisory Opinion, note 46 above.

53

Certain Expenses, note 51 above, at 168.

54

Kosovo Advisory Opinion, note 46 above.

55

Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom); Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom).
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decide on provisional measures, the two states engineered the passage of a Security Council
resolution under Chapter VII calling on Libya to give up the suspects. The Court then dismissed
the request for provisional measures as moot. But as Sloan and Hernandez note, five years later
the Court declined to find that the Security Council resolutions superseded the rights under the
Montreal Convention, suggesting that this was an issue for the merits phase, which ultimately
did not proceed.
In these matters, the ICJ has played its role as the principal judicial organ of the UN, but there
has been some evolution in the types of cases brought before it. The organs have both shaped
the composition and powers of the Court, and in the case of the General Assembly in particular
also served as a client for the Court, bringing requests for advisory opinions.
Conclusion
The ICJ has been deeply shaped by its institutional environment, both formal and informal, as it
has sought to provide adjudicative services and contribute to the development of the law. Its
performance has been subject to praise and criticism. But however much scholars criticize the
Court’s jurisprudence, it is helpful to understand that the ICJ is profoundly limited by its
institutional design and the nature of the international system. Without coercive powers, and
dependent on state consent for cases, the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations” was
destined to play a limited role from the outset in a world in which states were not actively
seeking to adjudicate disputes. It is noteworthy then, that its most important contributions
have been in the development of the law, a task not formally assigned to the Court at all. This
illustrates the utility of taking a broad institutional perspective to understand how courts
operate.
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Fundamental Questions
1. What are the institutional functions of the International Court of Justice and whose interests are
they addressed to?
2. Is compliance with decisions the most important indicator of a judicial institutions success?
3. Does an organization like the United Nations need a court?
4. Does the designation of the International Court of Justice at the “principal judicial organ”
matter? Could other courts handle some of its caseload?
5. What institutional reforms to the International Court would make it more effective as an
institution?
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